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The purpose of this report is to show briefly how the policies of the MemberStates
are being co-ordinated in the monetary and financial fields~ which are those with
which the Monetary Committee is specifically and directly concerned.
In the course of the year the Committee held ten meeting, and the working parties
dealing with the monetary and financial situations in the member countries met on
several occasions.
The officers having comple ted the two-year term fixed in the Statute, the Committee
unanimously re-elected Jonkheer  E.  van Lennep, Treasurer-General in the Nether-
lands Ministry of Finance, as Chairman, and  M. B.  Clappier, Vice-Governor of the
Bank of France and Dr  O.  Emminger, a member of the Bundesbank Direktorium, as
Vice-chairmen. A list of members is appended to this report.
The report was adopted on  arch  1967.  It does not take into account economic
developments or measures adopted after that date, whether in the Community or
elsewhere.PART I
Chapter I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Ten years have passed since the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community was signed in Rome. This is therefore a not inap-
propriate moment for the Committee to ask themselves what were the
intentions of its authors with regard to co-operation on monetary and
financial policy  those with which the Committee is directly and specif-
ically concerned  and to see how far the procedures used have been
effective and to consider whether experience suggests improvements. The
experience gained in these ten years will be the first topic to be covered,
the second will be the prospects for the future.
The general background
2. Article 104 of the Treaty of Rome requires each of the Member States
to pursue II the economic policy necessary to ensure the equilibrium of
its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency,
while ensuring a high level of employment and the stability of the level of
prices II. Article 105 created the Monetary Committee to help in the at-
tainment of these objectives in the monetary and financial fields.
3. With the work allotted to it since the signing of the Treaty of Rome,
the Committee today faces four main tasks:
- To promote the co-ordination of the monetary and financial policies of
the Member States;
- To follow and report regularly to the Council and the Commission on
the monetary and financial situations of the Member States and on their
general payments arrangements;
- To elaborate opinions on ways and means of eliminating  to the extent
necessary for the smooth working of the Common Market  all restric-
tions on the free movement of capital between the Member States;
- To carry out consultations with a view to harmonizing the major deci-
sions and policies of the Member States in the field of international
monetary relations, notably with regard to the functioning of the inter-
national monetary system and the participation of the Member States in
major monetary support operations.
4. Article 104 sets for the Member States three economic objectives
which are well known and universally approved: payments equilibrium,
high employment, and price stability.This article, which comes immediately after the declaration that short-
term economic policy is a matter of common interest, is the first in the
Chapter on the balance of payments. It specifies ina particular field the
import of the general objective set for the Community by Article 2 of the
Treaty, which calls for II steady and balanced expansion II of the member
countries' economies.
The emphasis in this article is on the fact that equilibrium in the overall
balance of payments is the over-riding objective of economic policy in
each Member State -- it being understood that the latter cannot of course
disregard employment and price-levels. This approach reflects the cli-
mate of opinion at the time, when the main threat to the effective imple-
mentation of the Common Market was felt to be the precarious interna-
tional payments relations and the inadequacy of the reserves held by
certain Member States.
5. In fact there have been a number of developments in the last ten
years which could hardly have been foreseen in 1957 and which have to
some extent changed the conditions under which the Treaty has been
implemented.
The re-establishment of the external convertibility of the European cur-
rencies at the end of 1958 and the complementary measures taken to
facilitate the movement of capital have gone far towards eliminating the
obstacles that were hampering external trade and capital movements
across frontiers. The momentum of the Common Market, too, has been
an incentive for more capital from other industrialized countries to flow
towards the Community.
Growth in the Common Market has continued at a high rate, and this has
been mainly due to the considerable expansion of production capacity that
has stemmed from ~e high rate of investment coupled with a sharp in-
crease in productivity. These developments have helped to strengthen
substantially the competitive position of the Member States vis-a.-vis
non-member. countries, thus engendering large and persistent surpluses
on the Community' ' trade with the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, the deficits experienced by the United States of America in
recent years have been exerting a profound influence on international
monetary relations and in particular on the EEC.
The Community s progress has also been facilitated by the substantial
and lasting improvement in the economic, monetary and financial situation
of France that has followed the stabilization measures adopted by that
country in 1958 and the new exchange rate subsequently adopted.
Lastly, all member countries have suffered, at different times and to
varying degrees, from periods of inflationary pressure due to internal
factors.Internal and external equilibrium
6. From the point of view of the co-ordination of economic policy within
the European Economic Community, these developments have meant that
the problems connected with internal and external equilibrium have not
been of the types anticipated. Instead of heavy and persistent payments
deficits or a marked weakening of domestic demand, the Member States
have had to cope with external surpluses and domestic strain. For this
reason the Committee has devoted a considerable part of the time at its
disposal to examination of these economic and monetary problems which
are at one and the same time internal and external. It has frequently
stated its views on these problems in the regular reports it makes to the
Council and to the Commission on the monetary and financial trends 
the Member States and in the opinions which it has formulated on specific
proposals submitted by the Commission to the Council.
7. The emergence of heavy payments surpluses or deficits is almost
always evidence that the domestic equilibrium has been upset. Since the
task of ensuring general economic equilibrium is the. responsibility of
the public authorities in each Member State, it is not sufficient for the
Committee to consider only the overall payments balance betWeen the
Community and non-member countries. For example, no one could claim
that the Dutch payments deficit of 1966 was immaterial because in the same
year Italy had a heavy surplus. It would also be a mistake to imagine that
the heavy external payments surplus expected for 1967 in Germany would
be a deyelopment of no importance because it is likely to be offset, at
least in part, by a deterioration in the external payments balances of Italy
and of France. Such changes in the balances betWeen the individual coun-
tries in the Community inevitably upset the economic equilibrium of each,
and therefore call for corrective measures, which should not be delayed
by excessive resort to the palliative offered by compensatory movements
of short-term capital.
8. The growing interpenetration of the national economies within the EEC
has meant that economic trends in the Member States are increasingly
dependent one upon the other. The development of inflationary strain in
one member country has often provoked inflationary symptoms in the
economies of the others, contamination being carried by the balances on
current account. The Committee has on several occasions drawn attention
to this phenomenon in its annual reports. 
Today, then, attainment of the economic objectives of each Member State
depends in very large measure on the way the economy develops in the
other member countries. But despite what the authors of the Treaty may
have feared, the essential danger has lain not in developments which
might have forced the authorities to abandon measures to liberalize the
movement of goods and capital and thus have jeopardized the establishment
of the Common Market: it is the actual domestic equilibrium of the coun-
tries themselves which has been threatened. Price stability has been
endangered and in all member countries experience has shown that whensufficient vigilance is not exercised in this field employment and the
economic growth in general will in the long run suffer. It has thus become
clear that the Community, and consequently the Monetary Committee,
cannot avoid concerning itself with the conditions which affect the econom-
ic and financial equilibrium in each Member State.
9. But it has also become clear that even in the present advanced phase
of integration economic trends may differ from one country to another,
leading the Member States to adopt conflicting measures which inevitably
affect the economies o~ the other countries and may in certain cases
produce results which actually hamper achievement of the objectives being
pursued by the authorities of these other countries. The divergent trends
in the various member countries have certainly sometimes contributed to
greater short-term economic stability in the Community taken as a whole,
but on other occasions inflationary trends have had a cumulative effect.
The principle of co-ordinating national policies should therefore be applied
in such a way that the measures adopted in one or more Member States
hamper as little as possible the economic policies pursued by their part-
ners and enable ~e common objectives outlined in the Treaty to be safe-
guarded in the Community as a whole.
The instruments of economic policy
10. In previous annual reports,. the Committee has repeatedly stressed
the importance of the range of instruments available for ensuring that the
objectives of internal and external monetary and economic policy will be
attained; it has also stressed how important it is that the countries should
in fact be ready to use these instruments.
0)  Budget policy
11. In this context, budget policy has a major role to play. It must,
however, be conceded that in the past there have been many gaps in the
fabric of budget policy. In most member countries the authorities, and in
certain cases the local authorities in particular, have definitely helped to
aggravate economic strain.
12. By 1962, central government expenditure was almost everywhere
beginning to expand at a rate which soon tended to exceed that of the in-
crease in the national product at current prices. Expenditure by the local
authorities also expanded at a rapid pace, mainly because of the needs of
urbanization. These considerations have made increasingly clear the
limits of work in the purely monetary field and induced the Council of the
Community to break new ground.
13. The Council' short-term economic policy recommendations of
15 April 1964 laid the main emphasis on the need to curb sharply the net
contribution to economic activity. made from public funds. These recom-mendations were confirmed on 8 April 1965 and re-issued in slightly
amended form on 22 December 1966. In general, the Member States have
endeavoured to comply with these rules, but the difficulties they have
encountered have' often been considerable. The Committee nevertheless
still considers that criteria in this field are necessary.
14. The Committee appreciates the difficulties involved in a more flexible
manipulation of the budgetary instrument -- especially because public ex-
penditure is relatively inelastic in the short-term  but wishes to stress
once again that greater use should be made of this instrument in re-es-
tablishing and maintaining general economic equilibrium. In this connec-
tion, the establishment of public expenditure forecasts covering several
years should make possible more .flexible handling of public finance policy
in the medium term. Such .forecasts would also help to strengthen the
stabilizing impact of variations in fiscal revenue due to business fluctua-
tions, and would enable the authorities to put this factor to better use.
The budgetary instrument must none the less be improved if it is to play
its proper counter-cyclical role.
b) Monetary policy and capital  movements
15. A more deliberate use of budget policy by no means implies neglect
o.f monetary policy: it would be unrealistic to imagine that a budget policy
could be applied with such detail and that it could be geared so closely to
the changing course of events that the support of monetary policy would
become super.fluous. The experience of recent years has shown that the
generally accepted objectives of monetary policy have not been fully a-
chieved, so the instruments of monetary policy must be strengthened and
adapted. The Committee is therefore highly appreciative of the measures
taken by certain Member States in recent years to improve and modernize
the monetary instruments at their disposal. For example, the experience
of certain member countries in using instruments such as minimum
reserves and credit ceilings has induced several others to adopt the same
techniques as a means of strengthening the effectiveness of their monetary
policies.
The Committee has .from the outset taken an interest in this problem and
in 1962 it published a study on the instruments of monetary policy.
A factor strengthening its conviction that thes~ instruments and the con-
ditions in which they can be used must be improved is that the monetary
measures taken by one country may have a great impact on the develop-
ment of the situation in the other countries. Progress in this direction is
the more necessary now that firms and commercial banks in the member
countries .can make use of the increasingly large-scale facilities offered
by the Euro-dollar market. Failing harmonization of the range of mone-
tary instruments available to the Member States and greater co-ordination
of national policies, this situation is liable to diminish the effectiveness
of these policies, which will still have an important rolE; to play in main-
taining internal and external equilibrium.16. Article 69 of the Treaty gives the Committee a part to play in the
liberalization of capital movements, which, according to Article 67, must
brought about II to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the
Common Market ". In the early years of the Community , the adoption of
the tWo directives on capital movements went far to promote freedom in
this field. Today the Netherlands and Italy, and in lesser measure France
still impose exchange restrictions on certain transactions, particularly
the short-term movement of money and the issue of foreign securities.
In all the Member States, however, capital movements are still hampered
by certain administrative, fiscal, or institutional difficulties. This situa-
tion unquestionably can and should be improved, if only in view of the ob-
jectives laid down in the Treaty of Rome, particUlarly in Article 3 and 67.
17. It looks very much as if fuller liberalization of capital movements
would lead to better utilization of savings and might even, for this very
reason, encourage its formation. However, this purpose will be fully
attained only to the extent that the liberalization of these transactions is
accompanied by fuller interpenetration of the EEC capital markets.
18. The liberalization of financial transactions undoubtedly raises diffi-
culties in present circumstances. It is because of these difficulties that
certain Member States still maintain exchange restrictions: there is much
to be said for retaining the right to pursue monetary policies tailored to
fit the trends prevailing in the several countries as long as these trends
diverge, but in financial relations with other countries these policies may
lead to results which are not consonant with those sought in the domestic
field. More generally, it should be remembered that if the movement of
short-term funds is completely liberalized it may, in certain circum-
stances, be found necessary to adapt the arrangements by which each
Member States ensures general economic equilibrium.
This is why endeavours to achieve increased liberalization of capital
movements not only entail fuller co-ordination of monetary and budget
policies but also require efforts to devise techniques that would make
possible the effective control of economic trends in the Member States
without exchange restrictions despite the progressive elimination of the
manifold obstacles to capital movements.
c)  Wages and price policy
19. The Committee has devoted more and more attention to the rise of
prices and production costs. In recent years, and particularly since 1963
prices and costs have increased appreciably, although to differing degrees
in all the member countries. More generally, the price trend has not been
sufficiently in line with the objectives laid down in the Treaty of Rome.
20. In addition - and this state of affairs is perhaps even more serious 
it would seem that the authorities are all too apt to take a price increase
of several points per year for granted. Quite apart from all the harm
which may be caused, especially from the social angle, by a steady upwardmovement of prices, it betrays the existence of excessive strains that
could engender liquidity crises or induce periods of recession. The per-
sistent upward movement of prices also encourages a tendency to increase
indebtedness at the same time as it diminishes the propensity to save, and
this leads to higher interest rates. If prices go on rising more rapidly in
the Community than in the rest of the world, the balance of payments may
be affected, because the Community' s exporting industries lose their.
ability to compete on world markets.
21. But to confine inflation in the Member States merely' to the level
recorded in the countries which are the REG's main trading partners
would be a modest objective. The economies interact, just as they do
within the Community, in the wider framework of the western world, and
it may be wondered whether the Common Market countries could not make
a useful contribution to the world economy by endeavouring to apply a
policy which would make the EEG a centre of price stability. The more
countries implementing such a policy, the greater their influence would
be on the rest of the world.
In this connection, as the Committee has stressed in several of its re-
ports, an incomes policy is indispensable. This instrument is particularly
valuable in that it enables the Member States to pursue a policy of har-
monious expansion without overstepping the increasingly narrow bounds
beyond which lurks the threat of inflation or of recession. But an incomes
policy can succeed only if budget and monetary policies are pursued in
such a way as to ensure that generalized strain on the labour market is
avoided.
Outlook
22. The TF.eaty of Rome requires that Member States shall co-ordinate
their policies with a view to the attainment of the Treaty objectives.
Since it came into force, this co-ordination has in fact been making prog-
ress. The Committee is, nevertheless, aware that current developments
in the Community mean that the need for increasingly close and effective
co-ordination is greater than ever.
In its seventh annual report, the Committee had already discussed the
implications of this evolution, which was leading to de facto monetary
integration. It had, at the time, mentioned as one factor in the proposed
common agricultural policy, a policy which is now complete on paper and
will be implemented stage by stage betWeen 1 July 1967 and I July 1968.
The customs union will also be complete on 1 July 1968. In addition, as
already mentioned in this report, the movement of capital between the
Member States is tending to grow more intense. And finally, a recent
Council decision has already set in motion the process of fiscal harmo-
nization.23. In these circumstances, further advances in the co-ordination 
economic and monetary policies are proving necessary" First, something
should be done to. make the national policies more effective. Certain
Member States have in recent years allowed home demand to. fluctuate to
such an extent that domestic equilibrium was threatened and that the econ-
omies of the other countries were affected, when more appropriate policies
would have enabled demand to be contained within reasonable limits. 
is true that to some extent these trends derive more from inadequacies
in the execution of national policies than from lapses in co-ordination~and
progress in the execution of these policies would considerably enhance the
benefits to be obtained from co-ordination.. But co-ordination work must
increasingly assume the form of consultations prior to every economic or
monetary decision which will affect in any appreciable degree the econo-
mic development of other Member States. Progress could be made in this
connection if quantitative objectives were worked out at Co.mmunity level
to back up the policy chosen" As mentioned above, the establishment of
guide lines for the implementation of budget policies would be one im-
provement, although there would be no need for the objectives to be made
identical for all the countries" The form of such guide lines could be
worked out in more systematic consultations and by agreement on the
best method of putting them forward.
24. The co-ordination process has already been strengthened and extended
by the establishment, in 1960, of the Short-term Economic Policy Com-
mittee, and in 1964, of the Budget Policy Co.mmittee and the Medium-term
Economic Policy Committee. The Committee of Governors of Central
Banks was also set up in 1964. The Ministers of Finance of the six co.un-
tries meet regularly, and the Council itself is devoting increasing attention
to general economic policy problems.
The chairman of the Monetary Committee attends ex officio the meetings
of the Sho.rt-term Economic Policy Committee and of the Budget Policy
Committee, and this strengthens the Commission s efforts to ensure close
co--ordination of the work carried out by all three committees. In ~ddi-
tion, the chairman attends the meetings held at regular intervals by the
Ministers of Finance. Similar arrangements a;re being made to ensure
co-operation with the Council.
25. At these meetings informatio.n is exchanged on the economic and
monetary situations and on the intentions of the authorities of each coun-
try. To some extent, too, the members of the Committees evolve agreed
basic concepts with regard to. economic and monetary policies and their
meetings are an experiment in management of national policies. Econo-
mic policy is pragmatic by nature, and growing co-operation in this field
cannot be expressed in rigid rules or in terms of formal obligations. It
constitutes nevertheless an essential and increasingly important contri-
bution to the actual institution of the cammon market. While the day-to-
day co-operation certainly goes as far as could have seemed possible when
the Treaty of Rome was drawn up, it is none the less clear that further
progress is needed today"International problems
26. The fourth main task of the Committee referred to at the beginning
of this Chapter is to ensure harmonization of the views of the Member
States On international monetary relations. During the period under
review, there have been large surpluses on the Community balance of
payments and heavy deficits on the United States balance of payments.
There is, however, no reason to assume a simple cause-and-effect rela-
tionship between these two phenomena simply because they have occurred
at the same time.
27. No way has yet been found, within the framework of the relations
between the industrialized countries, of eliminating satisfactorily the
disturbances to the international payments equilibrium that are apparent
in this situation. It is not, in fact, the current account covering goods and
services which has been the main problem. For the United States, as for
the EEC, the surpluses recorded under this heading have, for the past ten
years, approximately represented the sums needed to cover the interna-
tional responsibilities of the countries concerned, notably the aid they
must give to the developing countries.
28. The imbalances arise mainly from movements of capital. A broad
stream of American investment has been flowing into the EEC countries
and has offset the exports of capital from these countries to non-member
countries, especially the developing countries. This stream has been 
some extent due to fundamental economic realities. The establishment of
the common market, and the many repercussions of the new arrangement
in the field of economic expansion and economic structure, have created
a climate favourable to investment. It is natural that American companies
should have wished to take advantage of these opportunities, particularly
as they have been worried about the effects the common external tariff
might have on .their direct exports to Community countries. But many
other considerations have also influenced the flow of capital. The gap
betWeen interest rates in the United States and in the EEC countries has
also been a relevant factor.
29. Action should be taken to correct the existing imbalance in payments
between the United $tates and the Community. If the policy by which this
aim is pursued in the next few years is to prove successful, each party
must have a clearer picture of its responsibilities. The United States
should limit its capital outflows to a figure not exceeding its current-
account surplus and, with the same objective in view, the EEC .countries
should ensure that an adequate figure for net capital exports is reached.
These are, of course, fundamental objectives which will remain valid for
many years.
30. Developments in the international secto~ strengthened the weight and
influence of the Community countries. The group which they form is
playing an increasingly important role in world economic exchanges; the
crease in its gold and foreign exchange reserves, the key position it hasassumed, in recent years, in supporting the operations of the International
Monetary Fund and in the implementation of the General Arrangements to
Borrow are giving the Community steadily increasing importance.
31. The very existence of the EEC has compelled the Member States 
consult one another in detail when deciding how they would deal with these
new problems. Harmonization of points of view quickly become one of
the Committee s main tasks. A broad measure of agreement has been
reached on a variety of important questions, such as the restoration of
international payments equilibrium, the conclusion and the renewal of the
General Arrangements to Borrow and the raising of IMF quotas. The work
carried out in this field by the Committee was confirmed by a decision of
the Council in 1964; this laid down that the Member States would carry
out prior consultations with the aim of maximum possible harmonization
of their decisions and points of view whenever important problems arose
in the field of international monetary relations. Although the many
detailed discussions of the working of the international monetary system
have not always led to full harmonization of views, they have at least
brought out a number of points of agreement and, where agreement has
not yet been achieved, helped the several countries to understand each
other s positions. The Committee is convinced that prior consultation in
this field will bring the various views steadily closer together and lead
eventually to their harmonization.Chapter II
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1966 AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE
32. Economic developments in the member countries are considered in
more detail in Part II of this report, which also resumes the main COn-
clusions reached by the Committee in its periodical examinations of the
monetary and financial situations of the Member States.
33. First, however, a broad picture should be drawn of economic devel-
opments in the Community as a whole during 1966. The rate at which
gross domestic product was ex.rpanding increased a little (4.5 % in real
terms, compared with 4% in 1965). Prices and costs continued to rise at
a relatively high rate in most member countries, adding to the strain on
both the labour market and the capital market.
34. This overall assessment of the economic trend in the Community
maskS trends which varied widely from country to country, and which
tended in fact to diverge more and more as the year advanced. For ex-
ample, expansion was confirmed in France and in Italy, whereas in the
early part oLtheyear inflationary pressures continued to grow in Germany
and in the Netherlands, where the authorities were obliged to take restric-
tive action. This policy contributed to the marked slowdown of expansion
in both these countries during the second half of the year. Events in these
countries have a marked resemblance to those which occurred in Italy and
in France during the period 1962-1964.
35. The most notable development in 1966 was the very lively upward
movement of interest rates in most member countries, a movement which
however came to a halt in the last months of the year. It was due to many
factors. In the first place firms, with their self-financing margins eroded
by the persistent upward movement of production costs, have been obliged
to borrow more on the capital markets. The market also had increasingly
to accommodate deficits in public budgets. As pointed out in Chapter 
budget policy has not always played its proper role in the countries
suffering from inflationary pressures, and the authorities have used mon-
etary instruments to combat strain. The arrangements for controlling
. the distribution of credit were tightened up by the Central Banks in the
course of the year, and this helped to curb the expansion of liquidity.
Lastly, the measures by which the United States sought to restrain capital
outflows and to curtail the creation of domestic liquidity attracted a con-
siderable flow of short-term capital from Europe to the United States and
increased the calls on European savings made by American investors.
36. With their effectiveness heightened by these developments, the efforts
made in Germany and the Netherlands to place economic activity on a
sounder basis have contributed to a marked slowdown of investment, which
in 1967 is likely to decline substantially, above all in Germany.The budget policy followed in these tWo countries was designed to restrain
domestic consumption, and in Germany at least the weakening of economic
activity has for several months been reflected in the emergence of large
external payments surpluses, which could well continue, and might even
build up further in 1967.
37. The emergence of these surpluses was due mainly to a very sharp
- increase in the surplus on trade; the long-term capital account, which had
yielded a surplus in 1965, was in balance for 1966.
In Italy and in France, the economic recovery contributed to a conslGerable
reduction in the credit balance on current account. In both countries net
exports of capital also helped to diminish the overall surpluses. There
was some deterioration in the Benelux countries' current operations with
abroad.
38. There has, then, been a fairly considerable change in the payments
situations- of the various Member States. The overall surpluses (1) in
Germany, France and Italy account for the fact that in 1966 the Community
had in its dealings with the rest of the world a surplus which, though still
large, was down from ~2 400 million to ~l200 million. The bulk of this
surplus was offset by an increase in the Member States' holdings with the
IMF (~735 million). Moreover, it should be noted that the final figure was
reduced by means of certain II offset" transactions (e.g. advance repay-
ments of money owed to the United States and by investing certain sums
for a period of over one year on the United States money market).
39. From the preliminary figures at present available it would seem that
1966 brought no improvement in the United States external position; in fact
examination of the main items reveals a qualitative deterioration in the
balance of payments. The current account has unquestionably suffered
from the pressure on available resources due to the economic disturbances
entailed by the growing war effort. The fact that on paper the position
looks healthier than a year ago is solely due to those capital operations
most prone to ephemeral variations or most directly reflecting the co-op-
erative action which, as pointed out above, was taken by foreign monetary
authorities.
40. In 1967 it is unlikely that the movement of short-term funds will make
the same contribution to financing the US balance of payments as they did
in 1966. There is little reason to expect that part of the American deficit
will be covered by the accumulation of dollars by the monetary institutions
of the industrialized countries. It therefore seems probable that if in 1967
the United States has to finance a deficit comparable with that of 1966, the
most appropriate temporary solution will ultimately consist in recourse
to the IMF.
) Balance corresponding to the sum of the following items:
a)  Changes in official gold and foreign exchange reserves
b)  Changes in net IMF holdings (gold tranche plus GAB)
c) Changes in the net positions of the commercial banks vis-a.-vis abroad.41. In 1966 the United Kingdom balance of payments showed an improve-
ment on the preceding year only from the middle of the year onwards.
However, the British authorities expect a sizeable surplus for 1967. To
ensure the restoration of external equilibrium, the United Kingdom has
been obliged to halt the expansion of domestic activity, and the chances
of getting the economy moving again without the risk of another early
stop depend to a great extent on the success of the British Government'
efforts to implement an effective incomes policy.
42. In the field of international capital movements, the Committee sub-
mitted two opinions to the Commission in 1966. The first dealt with
further liberalization measures for the immediate future. Having noted
that an increase in the movement of capital to non-member countries
would reduce payments disequilibria, which had sometimes exerted infla-
tionary pressure on economic developments in the EEC, the Committee
felt that further action should be envisaged in this field. It proposed that
those Member States still imposing exchange restrictions on international
capital movements should grant access to their capital markets not only
to borrowers resident in the other member countries but also to those
international' institutions whose operations consist primarily in the pro-
vision of long-term capital for the developing countries. The amount that
could be borrowed in this way would be fixed at a specified percentage of
gross domestic saving or agreed each year by the Council after consulting
the Committee. The Committee hopes that such measures would facilitate
Council approval of the draft third directive, which is specially concerned
with the elimination of laws and regulations hampering capital movements.
43. The Committee has been informed of another proposal, concerning
the submission to the Commission of statistics on movements of capital
betWeen the Community and non-member countries. In the opinion which
it rendered on this proposal, the Committee observ~d that facts and
figures on capital movements, both between the member countries and
between the Community and the non-member countries, would be of great
assistance in its work. Such information is essential, and the Committee
plans to make periodical analyses at intervals of not more than one year,
of the data received.
44. With regard to exchange regulations, liberalization measures have
been adopted by France and the Netherlands. Since October 1966 blanket
authority has been given to the banks in the Netherlands for the .settlement
through the official market  the only market to continue - of payments
relating to international transactions in securities.
In France, a more radical measure of reform was adopted on 31 J anu-
ary 1967, when financial relations with abroad were freed. Foreign invest-
ments in France and French investments abroad will, however, remain
subject to some degree of control.PART II
POSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRIES
AND MAIN FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
From 1964 onwards the German economy faced a h~gh level of excess
demand, due at first mainly to the steep growth of exports, and later to
soaring expenditure on investment; in addition there has been the vigorous
expansion of budgetary spending, notably on comsumption and in the shape
of transfer payments, which acquired .special importance in 1965. It was
not long before the economy drifted into a state of serious disequilibrium.
The result was a rapid increase in prices and costs at home and, exter-
nally, a serious deterioration in the balance of payments. The counter-
measures adopted by the monetary authorities included a higher Bank rate
and lower rediscount ceilings for the banks witl:1 the central bank, thus
tightening the credit squeeze imposed in the spring of 1964. The measures
taken by the Bundesbank to syphon off liquidity from the banking system
were made more effective by the emergence in 1965 of a heavy payments
deficit.
The effects of these arrangements were felt more and more strongly
during 1966, and by the end of the year, despite an increase in the real
gross national product of about 3% over 1965, the business situation had
grown so sluggish that there was the danger of stagnation or even of 
recession. Industrial production, which had been flattened out completely
in the summer, dipped a little towards the end of the year, so that all in
all the growth of this aggregate for 1966 will have been only about 2 
compared with 5.6 % in 1965. This less favourable trend was particularly
marked in the capital goods sector, where, for the last half of the year,
the figures were lower than those for the same months of the preceding
year.
There are several reasons for the decline in private and public invest-
ment. Profit margins in industry were being eroded by the persistent
rise of production costs, leaving less scope for self-financing, and the
growing disequilibrium of the public finances in 1965 led to heavier calls
on the capital market. The strain thiS entailed was aggravated by the
payments deficit and the credit squeeze. The resulting sharp increase in
interest rates, coupled with uncertainty as to the subsequent development
of the economy, induced managements to scale down their equipment
programmes considerably. In the public sector, too, the financing diffi-
culties that arose in 1966 were the main reason for the slower expansion
of expenditure, particularly investment expenditure. .To the decline in investment has more recently been added an unmistak-
able decline in the expansion of household consumption. This change in
the general business climate has made it possible to slow down the rise
in prices, and the upward movement of wages also lost much of its mo-
mentum, although unit costs continued to rise.
. The slower growth of domestic demand helped to reverse the trend of
external payments: expo~ts increased by about 11% in volume, whereas
the level of imports showed little change. Thus the trade balance ,closed
with a surplus of about DM 8000 million, compared with DM 1200 million
in 1965, and the effect on the current account was correspondingly radical:
whereas in 1965 there had been a DM 6000 million defiCit, there was a
surplus of DM 350 million in 1966. The overall balance of payments closed
in 1966 with a surplus of DM 2100 million, compared with a deficit of
DM 6.60 million in 1965. This surplus was reflected in an increase in gold
and foreign exchange reserves of DM 1000 million (in 1965 they had con-
tracted by DM 1500 million), in an increase in net holdings with the IMF
of DM 720 million (in 1965 there had been an increase of OM 660 million)
and in an improvement in the commercial banks' net foreign exchange
holdings of DM 390 million (compared with an increase of DM 190 million in 1965). 
At its session of 8-9 December 1966, the Committee examined the mone-
tary and financial situation in the Federal Republic of Germany and noted
that in view of the signs of a slacker trend in investment, which for the
first time since. the war was affecting even the building industry, the need
to support business activity had become more immediate. The relaxation
of strain on the labour market (one symptom of which was a decline in the
number of foreign workers) might well facilitate measures to revive the
economy. Such a policy could however be implemented without risk 
price stability only if the upward cost movement were brought to a halt.
There is no doubt that the way the public finances have been handled in
recent years has been largely responsible for the present situation. The
very rapid expansion of current expenditure on goods and services and of
transfer payments in a period of buoyant business added to the inflationary
pressures which have made monetary restrictions necessary. In addition,
the need to finance public expenditure by heavy calls on the capital market
aggravated the difficulties already facing private borrowers.
If, in view of the slacker trends that are becoming apparent, action
through the budget were needed to support the level of business activity,
the Committee felt that this action should be such that the first to benefit
would be public and private investment  the fields most affected - and
that in this connection the re-establishement of a better relationship
betWeen public consumption expenditure and public investment expenditure
was of special importance, provided all precautions were taken to ensure
that the financing of supplementary public invest:Qlent did not engender
further strain on the capital markets"The Committee also recommended that credit policy be made more elastic..
The Bundesbank has since scaled down its discount rate from 5 to 4 % in
two stages and adopted a considerable number of measures designed to
increase the liquidity of the banking system. The Committee agrees that
this policy is preferable to trying to widen the capital market through
abolition of the II Kouponsteuer It, a measure which would in any case tend
to upset the balance of international payments and the capital markets of
Germany s neighbours. In view Of the surplus on current account predicted
for 1967, there is in fact a case for aiming at net capital exports.
As in 1965, the Committee emphasized the need to ensure a better policy
mix with a view to balanced growth in the longer term.
But if growth is to be achieved in a climate of price stability, the upward
movement of unit costs must be halted, and in this context incomes policy
calls for special attention. The Federal Government has already en-
deavoured to adjust the wage trend to economic requirements through a
concerted operation covering workers and managemen~s: wage increases
in 1967 should be aligned on longer-term improvements in productivity.
FRANCE
The recovery which got under way in the spring of 1965 was maintained in
1966 and spread to most industries, though the growth rate declined in the
third quarter.
The growth of exports, which had been particularly lively in the early
months, subsequently lost considerable momentum as a result of less
favourable business conditions in countries which are France s major
customers: for the year as a whole, the increase was about 7 % by volume
compared with 11 % in 1965.
On the other hand, domestic demand was firm throughout; the most dynam-
ic impetus came fr~m the recovery of productive investment, which rose
by 7 %, and from the growth of local and central government investment,
which was maintained at 10 %. Residential construction demand, however
slowed down sharply in the course of the year.
Private consumption also contributed to the maintenance of demand: it
rose by 4.5%, compared with 3.2% in 1965. The same applies to public
consumption, where the growth rate went up from 2.3 % to 4.2 %.
The average expansion of industrial production (including building and
public works), which in 1965 had been only 1.4 %, reached 6.8% in 1966. The
services sector too was very busy, so that although overall agricultural
production was little higher than in the exceptionally good year thatpreceded, gross national product for 1966 was  at constant prices 
nearly 5% up, against 3.4% for 1965.
Imports of goods and services rose sharply, the annual rate of growth
(volume) jumping from 3.6 to 12 %.
Thanks to appreciable productivity gains; to the relatively high elasticity
of supply and to the maintenance of controls, the upward movement in
consumer prices, which was steady and moderate throughout the year, did
not, on average, exceed 2.7%.
The current balance of payments suffered from the impact of the divergent
trend of exports and imports. Net inflows of foreign capital also declined
considerably. Consequently 1 the surplus on the overall balance of payments
was a mere FF 1718 million, compared with FF 4503 million in 1965.
The surplus was reflected in an increase in official monetary reserves
(excluding the IMF position) of FF 1432 million (in 1965, FF 2146 million)
and in an increase in net holdings with the IMF of FF 513 million (in 19651
F F 1 310 million) 1 while the net holdings abroad of commercial banks
declined by FF 227 million (in 1965 there had been an increase in this item
of FF 1047 million).
The rate at which the money supply was expanding slowed down appreciably
from the second half of the year onwards. For the full year, the figure is
much the same as that for the gross national product (value). Domestic
liquidity was swollen by transactions with abroad (though less than in 1965)
and the Treasury was able to reduce its short-term indebtedness. Loans
to the economy were therefore the main source of new liquidity in 1966:
according to estimates (still provisional) bank lending increased by
FF 19000 million  which would mean a distinct rise in the growth rate,
from 12% to 14.5%.
When, in the spring of 1966, the Committee examined the monetary and
financial situation of France, it recommended that the authorities should
endeavour to ensure that the more favourable business conditions were
not accompanied by an upward price trend appreciably greater than that
already predicted. It pointed out that although the policy of controls was
making it possible to slow down the upward price movement, an income
policy designed to prevent an undue expansion of production costs was
also needed. It advised the authorities to avoid, in particular, anything
which might make it more difficult to narrow the gap between the rate of
increase and wage and salary incomes and the average improvement in
productivity, since in its view too substantial an increase in distributed
incomes would be liable not only to cause too steep an expansion of con-
sumption, but also to hamper the efforts being made to stimulate investment.
The Committee noted that advanc~s in equipment were to be made easier
by an extension of financing facilities available to .industry; it welcomed
the relevant measures adopted in 1965 and expressed the hope that the ac-
tion put in hand would be pursued. It pointed out that. means for restrainingoverall demand were available should it prove necessary to combat infla-
tionary pressures. The arsenal of monetary policy instruments was
subsequently further improved by the introduction, in January 1967, of a
monetary reserve system superseding the old special system of minimum
reserves (" coefficient de tresorerie It). A provisional adjunct to the new
arrangement is a rule concerning compulsory employment of funds at
medium term.
Lastly, the Committee noted that the French authorities have remained
loyal to the principle of budget equilibrium. This should not, however, be
an end in itself, and it might well prove necessary to give the budget a
mor~ reflationary or deflationary twist when it is seen how overall demand
is developing.
ITALY
The expansion of the Italian economy continued in 1966. Gross national
product in real terms increased by about 5.3%, against 3.4% for 1965.
Activity was supported not only by demand from abroad but increasingly
by domestic demand as well, notably private consumers' expenditure and
gross fixed asset formation.
Exports of goods and services, nevertheless, remained the major factor
in expansion, although their advance slowed down after the summer. For
1966 the year-to-year increase by volume was about 1l.6%. Private con-
sumers' expenditure increased by 5. 5 %, with the emphasis of demand on
durable goods. Gross fixed asset formation, which had dropped more
than 7 % in 1965, rose again by about 6..2 %, mainly owing to a recovery in
building and construction.
Industrial production was nearly U.7 % up on the 1965 figure. However,
the employment situation showed hardly any improvement, save that the-
number of hours worked per person employed increased slightly. On the
other hand, substantial productivity gains were achieved because firms
were running nearer to capacity than in 1965.
Business activity expanded in an atmosphere of relative price stability.
The consumer price index showed a year-to-year increase of about 2.3 %,
which is appreciably less than in preceding years.
The more marked recovery of business activity stimulated a sharp in-
crease in imports (16.2% by volume for 1965, compared with a fall of 1.
for 1965), and this led to a heavier deficit on the trade balance and conse-
quently a decline in the surplus on current account. The overall balance
of payments closed in 1966 with a surplus of Lit. 435 000 million compared
with Lit. 966000 million in 1965. This situation was reflected in an im-
provement in Italy s net position with the IMF of Lit. 209000 million (in1965 the improvement had been Lit. 252000 million) and in an increase in
the net position of the commercial banks of Lit. 255000 million (in 1965
the improvement had been Lit. 397 000 million) while net official external
holdings (excluding net position with the IMF) declined by Lit. 29 000 mil-
lion (in 1965 there had been an improvement under this heading of Lit. 347000 million). 
The payments situation therefore contributed less to the expansion of
liquidity than in 1965. On the other hand, banks' lending to the economy
and to the public sector, particularly in the form of purchases of bills and
securities, increased sharply ~ so that bank liquidity contracted.
When; in June 1966, the Committee examined the monetary and financial
situation of Italy, it expressed the opinion that, in view of the scale o~ the
recovery so far and the need to ensure balanced progress in the future;
it would be undesirable for the authorities to take support measures over
and above those already implemented or being adopted.
The Committee did not rule out the possibility that an increase in public
expenditure leading to a heavier deficit might engender further inflationary
strain. Thus the objectives of monetary and financial policy and the prob-
lems to be solved were not the same as in 1965. What was needed in the
immediate future was careful supervision of expenditure programmes, so
that the authorities could adapt them flexibly to the needs of domestic
equilibrium. In the longer term; the share of investment in central gov-
rnment disbursements should be increased at the expense of consumption
and current transfer payments, the relative expansion of which had, in
past years; been particularly marked. In addition, it was recommendad
that the Italian authorities should endeavour to establish better co-ordi-
nation of actual expenditure by .the various public institutions, including
the local authorities.
If funds were to be found to cover the financing requirements of the public
sector which is saving very little) and of industry, where profit margins
are not yet back to normal, the Committee felt that it was essential to
develop household saving and to channel it more towards the capital market.
For this purpose, the Italian authorities ought to improve the functioning
of the .market "and to implement as rapidly as possible the measures by
which private saving was to be encouraged and savers' access to a much
wider range of investments to be facilitated.
With regard to the balance of payments, the Committee considered that
the expansion of domestic demand could be expected to lead, in the follow-
ing year, to a marked reduction in surpluses, which had been excessive.
In the meantime, these foreign exchange inflows would nevertheless cause
a sharp increase in the liquidity both of the banking system and of the
economy in general. The Committee welcomed the measures taken by the
central bank to neutralize surplus liquidities and to channel part of the
surplus towards those industries where an injection of fresh vigour was
still particularly necessary.The Committee would like to draw the attention of the Italian authoritieb
to the potential dangers of a mounting volume of liquidity caused by per-
sistent payments surpluses and the use of short-term borrowing to cover
Treasury deficits: the excess, of liquidity might well diminish the effec-
tiveness of a restrictive policy, should circumstances render such a
policy necessary.
NE THERLANDS
Expansion continued during the first half of 1966 at the high rate recorded
in 1965, but the pace appears to have slackened during the rest of the year..
An .early result of this change was a substantial decline in the pressure on
the labour market. In the second half of the year unemployment rose
from 1.1% to 1.6% of persons in paid employment, and the number of
. unfilled vacancies declined appreciably. Gross national product in real
terms seems none the less to have increased once again, this time by
about 4.5%, compared with 5.4% for 1965. The maintenance of a high rate
of growth is to be put down mainly to the marked development of industrial
investment and of public expenditure. Private consumers' expenditure
probably increased by no more than a small margin.
The lively progress of imports of goods and services was only partly
offset by the expansion of exports", which was slower than it had been in
1965; the current account (on a transactions basis), which had balanced
out in 1965g closed in 1966 with a deficit of about Fl. 800 million. The
overall balance of payments closed in 1966 with a deficit of FI. 192 milliong
compared with Fl. 103 million in 1965. This heavier deficit was reflected
in a decline in official reserves (excluding the IMF position) of Fl. 46 mil-
lion (in 1965 the decline had been Fl. 71 million) and in a deterioration in
the commercial banks' net holdings abroad of Fl. 344 million (in 1965 the
decline had been Fl. 370 million); the net position with the IMF improved
by Fl. 198 million (in 1965 the improvement had been Fl. 338 million)..
Receipts from taxation were lower than expected; partly for this reason
the central government resorted to short-term financing, and so helped
to boost domestic liquidity. Short-term borrowing by the local authorities
had the same effect, as did borrowing by the private sector, whose finance
requirements  geared to expanded production and higher prices  again
increased considerably.
The expansion of short-term bank lending in the first four months of 1966
exceeded the limits laid down, but this was more than offset during the
rest of the year. The increase in medium-term lending was considerable;
though not greater than the rise in the commercial banksf medium- and
long-term liabilities. Credit was therefore held within the limits fixed
by the Nederlandsche Bank, the aim of which is to ensure that the domes-
tic creation of liquidity should be in line with the trend of production inreal terms. However, since the public sector made heavier calls on the
money market than expected, the domestic creation of liquidity ultimately
exceeded the desired limit. Mainly because of the payments deficit, the
"liquidity quota" -- i.e. the volume of domestic liquidity as a proportion
of national income at current prices - none the less declined once again
in 1966.
The upward movement of consumer prices was appreciably more rapid
than in 1965 (6% instead of 4%), and production costs with wage in-
creases running well ahead of productivity gains ..... continued to ,grow.
In its last annual report the Committee had noted that satisfactory equi-
librium could not be restored in the Dutch economy unless greater use 
made of the instruments provided by the budget. The severe strain 
the capital market, due mainly to the heavy financing requirements of the
public sector, was liable to hamper the growth of private investment and
thus be a threat to the attainment of the objectives of harmonious longer-
term growth.. The Committee had accepted that the restoration of equilib-
rium was not feasible in 1965, but hoped that this would be achieved by 1966.
When it examined the monetary and financial situation of the Netherlands
at its session of 8-9 December 1966, the Committee found that its hopes
had not yet been realized. The responsibility for a counter-cyclical
policy having had to be assumed mainly by the central bank, certain in-
dustries, notably building and construction, were affected much more than
others. The growing strain on the money market was matched by a further
tightening of the capital market, so that to finance the deficit on its oper-
ations, the public sector was compelled to use short-term funds to a
substantially greater extent than had been expected.
The Committee noted that the draft 1967 budget tabled in the Dutch Par-
liament before the constitution of a new Government in November 1966
was framed along the right lines: it involves a slower expansion of current
expenditure. Developments in recent years, when actual expenditure
considerably exceeded estimates, are one factor among several suggesting
that the slowdown in the progress of expenditure will be achieved only if
the authorities keep more strictly to the draft budget as presented. The
new Government has deferred for six months the reduction in wages and
income tax planned for 1 January 1967 and brought forward to 1 July 1967
the increase in turnover tax scheduled for the beginning of 1968. The
increase in public saving through these measures should enable the Gov-
ernment to step up the flow of capital available to the local authorities,
so that they will not need to cover part of their needs, as in 1966, by short-
term borrowing.
ThiS budget policy is in line with the Committee s recommendations. It
would diminish the danger of inflation .and at the same time favour econ-
omic growth through the maintenance of public investment at a high level..
It would alsq help to create the conditions necessary for any relaxation
in monetary restrictions which might become desirable. The relaxationof strain on the capital market which could result from it would also
facilitate the development of private investment, thus helping to adjust the
pattern of overall demand.
In the implementation of a more balanced economic policy, incomes policy
assumes special importance. The very lively progress of wages in recent
years has to a large extent been reflected in higher costs, and threatens
increasingly to price Dutch products out of world markets. Something
must therefore be done to prevent the increase in wages and salaries
running ahead of productivity gains. In this connection, the Committee
notes that the Dutch authorities propose to limit to 4- 5 % all wage im-
provements conceded in collective agreements negotiated in 1967. None
the less, given the trends in other components of remuneration and the
impact of current agreements, this target corresponds to an increase in
income per person in paid employment of about 8 % and will still produce
a considerable increase in unit wage costs for 1967. A more strict limi-
tation of the upward movement in production costS and a better policy mix
are indispensable if the Dutch economy is not to suffer in future years
from both inflation and falling employment.
BELGIUM
Economic expansion in Belgium continued in 1966 at the same rate as in
1965, the increase in real gross national product having been a little more
than 3%. The growth of external demand lost momentum, mainly because
business conditions in certain countries which are the major customers
of Belgium, such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, had moved into a slack period. The growth of domestic demand
on the other hand, gathered a little pace in 1966, spurred on by public con-
sumption expenditure and the increase in building and in gross fixed asset
formation by industry. Household consumption seems to have increased
at much the same rate as in 1965.
While economic expansion maintained a stable rate, prices registered a
pronounced rise, due mainly to the upward movement of unit wage costs,
which continued although strain on the labour market eased a little. Con-
sumer prices rose by about 4%. It should, however, be noted that the rate
of increase has eased a little in recent months.
Expenditure on imports in the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union rose
sharply, especially during the first six months of the year; the annual
average was up 10.2%, against 6.8% in 1965. As exports also slowed
down, especially during the final six months  the annual average was
9%, against 10 % in 1965  the current balance of payments deteriorated
closing with a deficit of Bfrs. 4900 million. The overall balance of pay-
ments closed in 1966 with the deficit of Bfrs. 5 600 million, compared with
the surPlus of Bfrs. 8500 million in 1965. This deficit was reflected in adecline in official net external holdings (excluding the IMF position) of
Bfrs. 1300 million (in 1965 there had been an improvement of Bfrs. 2 900)
and a deterioration in the net external holdings of the commercial banks
(including certain financial and non-monetary institutions) of Bfrs. 7 300
million (in 1965 this item had shown an improvement of Bfrs. 500 million),
While the net position with the IMF improved by Bfrs. 3 000 million (follow-
ing an improvement in 1965 of Bfrs. 5 400 million).
The payments deficit had the effect of curbing the expansion of domestic
liquidity, but public-sector cash operations and the expansion of bank
lending to the private sector, although subject to official limits, tended to
support it. The upward movement of interest rates continued both on the
money market and on the capital market. Partly due to the increase in
interest rates abroad, it seems to have been mainly the result of disequi-
librium betWeen the supply of savings and the demand for capital emanating
from both the public and the private sectors.
The Banque Nationale endorsed the upward movement in interest rates by
raising Bank rate on 2 June 1966 from 4.75 to 5.25 %. On 28 April 1966 it
called on the banks to ensure that credits granted should not at any time
during 1966 be more than 12 % greater than the total of credits outstanding
on 31 December 1965; a similar limitation, but with a number of conces-
sions, has been maintained for the first half of 1967. Measures to slow
down expansion have also been applied with regard to lending by public
institutions, by private savings banks and by the life-assurance companies.
When, in the autumn of 1966, it examined the monetary and financial situ-
ation of Belgium, the Committee felt that there was nO reason to vary to
any appreciable extent the conclusions it had reached at its previous
examination in 1965. The general trends discernible in the .last months of
1966 induced the Belgian authorities to maintain the very cautious budget
and credit policies pending really convincing signs of relaxation.
As in. previous years, the Committee devoted special attention to the
problem of public finance. In view of the measures taken it looked as if
the balance of the ordinary budget would be restored in 1967, but the burden
of the extraordinary budget and of the investment expenditure outside the
budget, which for three consecutive years had been maintained at a fairly
constant level, was liable to increase appreciably. At the same time there
was, in view of the slowdown in economic expansion, some uncertainty as
to future receipts from taxation. Early in 1967 these doubts proved well-
founded, and the possibility that a deficit might again emerge induced the
Belgian Government to work out a general financial reorganization plan
which included the measures needed to get the economy under way again.
This operation was all the more necessary since in 1966 cash deficits 
the Treasury were still being financed to a considerable extent by calls
on the money market.. Long-term issues were taken up in large measure
by the banking system. Either directly or through the Belgian banks  II  the
Treasury drew an extra Bfrs. 4900 million from foreign sources.This situation means that unless the efforts already put in hand to ensure
that public saving will cover an increased share of central government
investment are maintained, it will be impossible to avoid excessive
strain on the capital market and recourse to short-term borrowing by the
Treasury .
LUXEMBOURG
As in the previous year, economic expansion was moderate in 1966. The
gross national product .at ,constant prices increased by only about 2 %,
compared with 1.5 % in 1965. As the slowdown in the growth of exportS
continued, owing mainly to the decline in foreign demand for iron and steel
products, there was no external contribution to expansion, despite the
increase in deliveries from the new industries recently set up in the
Grand Duchy. All in all, exports of goods and services increased 3.5% by,
volume, compared with a figure of 4.5 % for 1965.
The development of domestic demand, while remaining moderate, gathered
some slight momentum, owing largely to an increase in public expenditure
on goods and services; private consumers' expenditure increased at the
same rate as in 1965 (3% by volume). Thanks to the expansion of public
investment expenditure, gross fixed asset formation for the y~ar declined
less than in 1965 (by 6.5 % by volume, against 18% in 1965).
Because strain on the labour market continued, wage increases again
exceeded the advance of productivity and continued to force up costs. As
the increase in import prices also exerted pressure on prices, their up-
ward movement was little slower than in 1965.
On the capital market, both the public sector and the private sector were
calling for more funds, and so strain increased; this led to an appreciable
increase in interest rates.
When, in October 1966, the Committee examined the monetary and finan-
cial situation in Luxembourg, it concentrated on the trend of the public
finances. It noted that a rapid increase in the public debt, which had been
stable for many months, and the persistence of certain pressures on the
labour market, on wages and on prices suggested that appropriate measures
should be taken, but the Committee also recognized that a small country
like the Grand Duchy, surrounded by neighbours whose economies are by
and large in an expanstonary phase, does not have quite the same liberty
of action as a larger country with more diversified activities. It felt
nevertheless that although the deterioration of public finances can be
accepted in so far as it reflects a reduction in the growth of revenue, due
to the iron and steel situation, the authorities must ensure that budget
policy should not itself add to inflation pressures. This is why it recom-
!llended not only that the authorities should try to see that the excessesof expenditure over the 1966 budget estimates are not repeated in 1967,
but also that they should endeavour - as seems to be the intention of the
new Government -- to bring about a reduction in the rate of growth of the
Government' s commitments. Such a policy commends itself all the more
since persistence until 196.8 of the current difficulties in the iron and'
steel industry could further aggravate the problem of the public finances.ANNEX
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